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さTｴW Bヴｷデｷゲｴ “ﾗﾉSｷWヴ ｷゲ ﾐﾗ BﾗﾉゲｴW┗ｷﾆざく TｴW Bヴｷデｷゲｴ Aヴﾏ┞が DｷゲIｷヮﾉｷﾐWが ;ﾐS デｴW DWﾏﾗHｷﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ “デヴｷﾆWゲ 
of 1919 
 
Abstract: This article considers the breakdown in discipline in the British Army which occurred in 
Britain and on the Western Front during the process of demobilisation at the end of the First World 
War. Many soldiers, retained in the army immediately after the Armistice, went on strike, and some 
formed elected committees, demanding their swifter return to civilian life. Their perception was that 
the existing demobilisation system was unjust, and men were soon organised by those more politically 
conscious members of the armed forces who had enlisted for the duration of the war. At one stage in 
January 1919, over 50,000 soldiers were out on strike, a fact that was of great concern to the British 
civilian and military authorities who miscalculated the risk posed by soldiers. Spurred on by many 
elements of the press, especially the Daily Mail and Daily Herald, who both fanned and dampened the 
flames of discontent, soldiersげ discipline broke down, demonstrating that the patriotism which had for 
so long kept them in line could only extend so far. Though senior members of the government, 
principally Winston Churchill, and the military, especially Douglas Haig and Henry Wilson, were 
ｪWﾐ┌ｷﾐWﾉ┞ IﾗﾐIWヴﾐWS デｴ;デ BﾗﾉゲｴW┗ｷゲﾏ ｴ;S けｷﾐaWIデWSげ デｴW ;ヴﾏ┞が or, at the very least, the army had been 
unionised, their fears were not realised. TｴW ;ヴデｷIﾉW W┝;ﾏｷﾐWゲ デｴW ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ ゲデヴ;デWｪ┞ ヴWｪ;ヴSｷﾐｪ 
demobilisation, its efforts to assess the risk of politicization and manage the press, and its responses 
to these waves of strikes, arguing that, essentially, these soldiers were civilians first and simply wanted 
to return home, though, in the post-war political climate, government fears were very real.  
 
Keywords: demobilisation, Bolshevism, British Army, discipline, strikes 
 
Immediately hostilities cease we must be prepared for a general relaxation of the bonds of discipline; 
ﾏWﾐげゲ ﾏｷﾐSゲが WﾐWヴｪｷWゲ ;ﾐS デｴﾗ┌ｪｴデゲ ┘ｷﾉﾉ ﾐﾗ ﾉonger be occupied by the task of defeating and destroying 
the enemy, but will trend naturally towards early return home, the establishment or reconstruction of 
business or other kindred matters. Hence as soon as demobilisation commences a feeling of jealousy will 
arise, men will keenly watch the departures of others and will institute comparisons as to their respective 
claims, there will be generally an unsettled state and as the natural consequences of a prolonged and 
arduous war, nerves will be in an irritable and an unstable condition. We have, therefore, to realise that 
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the temper of the troops during this period will be a factor not to be lightly disregarded, but it must equally 
be recognised that this state of mind is natural and only to be expected. 1 
 
This memorandum was written in October 1917, over a year before the Armistice, by Field Marshal 
Sir Douglas Haig, the commander of forces in France and Belgium, for the consideration of the 
Secretary of State for War, Lord Derby. He wrote it in response to the draft plans for military 
demobilisation, which specified that men would leave the army based on their occupation, assessed 
on the economic needs of the country. While stating that he understood these requirements, he was 
of the opinion that the disciplinary side of demobilisation had not been given sufficient attention. His 
thoughts were distributed to both the Army Council and the War Cabinet later in 1917. In a rebuttal 
letter, he was told that the economy must take precedence, and thaデ けヮﾗ┘Wヴa┌ﾉ ;ｷS デﾗ デｴW ﾏ;ｷﾐデWﾐ;ﾐIW 
of discipline in France will be afforded by the knowledge that any active indiscipline will, in accordance 
with the regulations which have been drafted to carry out the Scheme of Demobilisation, entail delay 
ｷﾐ デｴW ﾏ;ﾐげゲ return to this countryげ.2 
After the turbulent few months of strikes and collective disobedience in the armed forces following 
the cessation of hostilities, this memorandum resurfaced and was presented once more to the Cabinet 
by Winston Churchill, the newly appointed Secretary of State for War. As a supplement to it, Churchill 
ゲデ;デWS デｴ;デ けｷデ ┘ｷﾉﾉ HW ゲWWﾐ デｴ;デ ｴW ぷH;ｷｪへ aﾗヴWI;ゲデWS ;II┌ヴ;デWﾉ┞ デｴW ゲデ;デW ﾗa ｷﾐSｷゲIｷヮﾉｷﾐW ;ﾐS 
Sｷゲﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ;ヴｷゲW ｷﾐ デｴW ;ヴﾏ┞ ｷaぐa;┗ﾗ┌ヴｷデｷゲﾏ ┘WヴW デﾗ ヴ┌ﾉW ｷﾐ ヴWｪ;ヴS デﾗ the discharge 
ﾗa ﾏWﾐげく ASSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉﾉ┞が デｴ;デ ｷデ ┘;ゲ けゲ┌ヴヮヴｷゲｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ デｴW Cﾗﾏﾏ;ﾐSWヴ-in-CｴｷWaげゲ ヮヴWゲIｷWﾐデ ┘;ヴﾐｷﾐｪゲ ┘WヴW 
utterly ignored, and the army left to be irritated and almost convulsed by a complicated artificial 
system open at every point to suspicion oa ﾃﾗHHWヴ┞ ;ﾐS ｴ┌ﾏH┌ｪげく3 There was certainly no doubting 
                                                          
1 TNA WO32/5241 Memorandum by Field-Marshal Sir Douglas Haig, to the Secretary of State for War, 4 October 
1917. 
2 Ibid. Reply to Sir Douglas Haig, from the Army Council, 5 December 1917. 
3 Ibid. Memorandum presented to the War Cabinet by Winston Churchill, 21 February 191; TNA WO32/5241 
Letters between H.J. Creedy, War Office, and J.T. Davies, Private Secretary to Lloyd George, 25 February 1919 
and 4 March 1919; CAB23/4/48 Conclusions of the 274th Meeting of the War Cabinet, 15 November 1917. 
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H;ｷｪげゲ ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾉWSｪW ﾗa デｴW ;ヴﾏ┞ ┌ﾐSWヴ ｴｷゲ Iﾗﾏﾏ;ﾐS and the risk that demobilisation had on the 
prospect of a breakdown in discipline. 
The initial scheme of demobilisation certainly had a huge impact on the discipline and general 
conduct of the army. Events at Folkestone, Calais, and many other areas across the United Kingdom 
IﾗﾐaｷヴﾏWS デｴｷゲく DｷゲIｷヮﾉｷﾐW ┘;ゲ ﾐﾗデ ; ｪｷ┗Wﾐが ;ﾐS ゲﾗﾏW ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴゲげ ┌ﾐ┘ｷﾉﾉｷﾐｪﾐWゲゲ デﾗ W┝デWﾐS デｴWｷヴ ヮ;デヴｷﾗデｷゲﾏ 
beyond the end of the conflict, is testament to the limited nature of discipline in the British Army of 
the First World War. TｴW ;ヴﾏ┞げゲ ｪﾗﾗS SｷゲIｷヮﾉｷﾐW S┌ヴｷﾐｪ デｴW ┘;ヴ has broadly been attributed to the 
unique British regimental system which promoted an inward looking perspective and encouraged 
pride in the regimental cap badge; as well as the strength of officer-man relations, and a promotion 
of paternalism through the Edwardian notion of working class deference towards social superiors に a 
conception which easily extended to the frontline. However, a distinction also emerged between 
regular (initially, the pre-war professional soldiers) and New Army battalions (those who enlisted in 
the opening months of the war), which meant that the latter were treated much more leniently. 
Essentially, officers were less strict, lacked formality, and relied much more heavily on self-discipline.4 
In the context of the demobilisation strikes this is significant as, essentially, soldiers, as well as the 
military authorities, ceased to view the men as anything other than civilians. The vast majority of 
soldiers wished to return to civilian life as quickly as possible because they had no desire to make 
soldiering their profession.5  
Nevertheless, this did not mean that there were no disciplinary concerns. After all, the New Armies 
had been recruited from the mainstream of society, rather than from the margins, as had the 
professional army until 1914. David Englander has stated that デｴWゲW ﾐW┘ ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴゲ けゲWWﾏWS IﾗﾐaｷSWﾐデが 
                                                          
4 I. Beckett, T. Bowman, and M. Connelly, The British Army and the First World War (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2017), p.154; T. Bowman, Irish Regiments in the Great War; Discipline and Morale (Manchester 
University Press, Manchester, 2003), p.203; G. Sheffield, Leadership in the Trenches; Officer-Man Relations, 
Morale and Discipline in the British Army in the Era of the First World War (Palgrave, Basingstoke, 2000), pp.178-
9. For more on the maintenance of discipline and morale in the British Army during the First World War see J.G. 
Fuller, Troop Morale and Popular Culture in the British and Dominion Armies 1914-1918 (Oxford University Press, 
Oxford, 1990); C. Gibson, Behind the Front: British Soldiers and French Civilians, 1914-18 (Cambridge University 
Press, Cambridge, 2014). 
5 Beckett, Bowman, Connelly, The British Army, p.141. 
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assertive, and altogether more resistant to the culture and ethos of the fighting services. Citizen-
ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴゲが デｴﾗ┌ｪｴ デｴW┞ ﾏｷｪｴデ HW ﾏ;SW ｷﾐデﾗ WaaｷIｷWﾐデ デヴﾗﾗヮゲが ヴWﾏ;ｷﾐWS ゲ┌ゲヮWIデげく6 This ethos, and 
therefore the foundation of its discipline, ヴWﾉｷWS ﾗﾐ デｴW けゲﾗﾉSｷWヴﾉ┞-ゲヮｷヴｷデげが ;ﾐS デｴｷゲ ┘;ゲ ﾏﾗst clearly 
expressed through patriotism and self-sacrifice. It appealed to the spiritual and the intellectual in this 
respect.7 Citizen soldiers, both volunteers and conscripts alike, had been inculcated with the belief 
that their discipline came from their patriotism, and especially their self-sacrifice に selflessly giving up 
their families, jobs, and lives. In this context, it is hardly surprising that once the enemy was defeated 
in November 1918, this notion of self-sacrifice was no longer relevant, that this form of discipline no 
longer applied. They were civilians once more, and should be able to return to their pre-war lives with 
the minimum of delay. As Helen B. McCartney has noted regarding the Liverpool Territorials, after the 
Armistice the men felt that they had completed their task, essentially there was no longer any 
incentive to endure the discomforts of army life.8 
Ia ┘W ;ヴW デﾗ ;ヴｪ┌W デｴ;デ ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴゲげ SｷゲIｷヮﾉｷﾐW I;ﾏW aヴﾗﾏ デｴWｷヴ ヮ;デヴｷﾗデｷゲﾏ ;ﾐS ゲWﾉa-sacrifice it is 
important to state what is meant by these two terms. Aﾐデｴﾗﾐ┞ Dく “ﾏｷデｴげゲ in his definition states that 
the nation ｷゲ け; ﾐ;ﾏWS ;ﾐS ゲWﾉa-defined human community whose members cultivate shared myths, 
memories, symbols, values, and traditionsげ ;ﾐS デｴ;デ けヴWゲｷSW ｷﾐ ;ﾐS ｷSWﾐデｷa┞ ┘ｷデｴ ; ｴｷゲデﾗヴｷI ｴﾗﾏeland, 
IヴW;デW ;ﾐS SｷゲゲWﾏｷﾐ;デW ; SｷゲデｷﾐIデｷ┗W ヮ┌HﾉｷI I┌ﾉデ┌ヴWが ;ﾐS ﾗHゲWヴ┗W ゲｴ;ヴWS I┌ゲデﾗﾏゲ ;ﾐS Iﾗﾏﾏﾗﾐ ﾉ;┘ゲげく9 
This is crucial in the context of First World War propaganda. In his study of patriotism and propaganda, 
David Monger has argued that the core narrative of wartime propaganda revolved around patriotic 
S┌デ┞が ｷﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ ; けデｴヴWW-ヮヴﾗﾐｪWSげ ﾏｷ┝デ┌ヴWが IﾗﾏHｷﾐｷﾐｪ けIｷ┗ｷI ヮ;デヴｷﾗデｷゲﾏげが ゲ┌aa┌ゲWS ┘ｷデｴ the rhetoric of 
けゲ;IヴｷaｷIｷ;ﾉ ヮ;デヴｷﾗデｷゲﾏげが ┘ｷデｴ ;ﾐ W┗ﾗI;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ┘ｴ;デ ｴW デWヴﾏゲ けIﾗﾐIヴWゲIWﾐデ Iﾗﾏﾏ┌ﾐｷデ┞げが ｪヴﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ デﾗｪWデｴWヴ 
                                                          
6 Dく Eﾐｪﾉ;ﾐSWヴが けDｷゲIｷヮﾉｷﾐW ;ﾐS ﾏﾗヴ;ﾉW ｷn the British army, 1917-ヱΓヱΒげが ｷﾐ Jく HﾗヴﾐW ふWSくぶが State, Society and 
Mobilization in Europe during the First World War (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009), pp.126-7. 
7 Ibid., p.126; 131. 
8 H.B. McCartney, Citizen Soldiers; The Liverpool Territorials in the First World War (Cambridge University Press, 
Cambridge, 2005), p.240. 




through shared sacrifice and acceptance of duty.10 John Horne has also argued that the remobilisation 
of society in 1917-18 focussed on the survival of the nation and its essential values depended on 
military victory.11 Though these studies are primarily concerned with civilian morale, much of this 
rhetoric also extends to soldiers. Alexander Watson has argued that propaganda that could provide 
meaning to a soldiers sacrifice was eagerly accepted, especially if it related to a duty to defend oneげゲ 
home community.12 In a more recent article with Patrick Porter, it has also been noted that for all 
classes of soldier, but especially middle-class men, the war represented an experience of sacrificial 
self-improvement and national renewal, and that victory validated this sacrifice. 13 With an 
increasingly politically conscious working-class army, these notions surely had limits, with the coming 
of the Armistice, these notions lost their significance very quickly. 
Throughout 1917 and 1918, though reaching the point of mutiny at Etaples, unrest was relatively 
minor. This does not mean that fears did not exist, especially within the context of the Russian 
Revolution. Concerns about the fragile nature of discipline, and the potential Bolshevist influence on 
soldiers, had surfaced when a number of Soldiers and Workers Councils had been formed in 1917.14 
In July of that year, Lord Derby had stated to the War Cabinet that; 
 
In view of the fact that the army of today is by no means as highly disciplined as that in existence before 
the war, and also that the classes of men serving at the present moment include individuals of every shade 
of education and opinion, it is probable that the movement to encourage soldiers to take part in political 
questions will be fanned by certain political factions for their own ends.15 
                                                          
10 D. Monger, Patriotism and Propaganda in First World War Britain; The National War Aims Committee and 
Civilian MoraleふLｷ┗Wヴヮﾗﾗﾉ Uﾐｷ┗Wヴゲｷデ┞ PヴWゲゲが Lｷ┗Wヴヮﾗﾗﾉが ヲヰヱヲぶが ヮくΒヶく Fﾗヴ デｴW けﾉ;ﾐｪ┌;ｪW ﾗa ゲ;IヴｷaｷIWげ ゲWW Aく GヴWｪﾗヴ┞が 
The Last Great War; British Society and the First World War (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008), 
Chapters 4-6. 
11 Jく HﾗヴﾐWが け‘WﾏﾗHｷﾉｷ┣ｷﾐｪ aﾗヴ けデﾗデ;ﾉ ┘;ヴげぎ Fヴ;ﾐIW ;ﾐS Bヴｷデ;ｷﾐが ヱΓヱΑ-ヱΓヱΒげが ｷﾐ Jく HﾗヴﾐW ふWSくぶが State, Society and 
Mobilization in Europe during the First World War (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1997), pp.204-5. 
12 A. Watson, Enduring the Great War; Combat, Morale and Collapse in the German and British Armies, 1914-
1918 (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2008), pp.82-4. 
13 Pく PﾗヴデWヴ ;ﾐS Aく W;デゲﾗﾐが けBWヴW;┗WS ;ﾐS ;ｪｪヴｷW┗WSぎ IﾗﾏH;デ ﾏﾗデｷ┗;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS デｴW ｷSWﾗﾉﾗｪ┞ ﾗa ゲ;IヴｷaｷIW ｷﾐ デｴW Fｷヴゲデ 
WﾗヴﾉS W;ヴげが Historical Research, vol.83, no.219, 2010, pp.156-64. 
14 Beckett, Bowman, Connelly, The British Army, p.154. 




As both F.S. Northedge and William L. Langer argued in the late 1960s, the Revolution had a profound 
impact on Britain domestically, as well as for its armed forces, and led some prominent politicians, 
such as Winston Churchill, to urge the military destruction of the Bolshevik regime as the only 
safeguard against communism in Europe.16 More recently, Chris Wrigley has suggested that it is no 
surprise that leading members of the government expressed concern about the spread of Bolshevism 
in Britain, and that the potential for unrest in the armed forces only accentuated these fears.17 Though 
unfounded, these fears certainly informed decision making, and were exacerbated by the concerted 
effort by elements of the labour movement to enlist support from the armed forces once strikes had 
broken out. As Nick Mansfield has observed, the army even served as a conduit leading people 
towards labour organisations such as the National Union of Agricultural Workers, and the National 
Union of Railwaymen.18 For an establishment suspicious of unionism, this must have been an alarming 
development. 
The historiography that focusses on the strikes themselves has been largely partisan in nature, 
often tending to play up the Bolshevist or, at a minimum, the trade union influence. The prominent 
Marxist, Tom Wintringham, wrote of his own role in mutinies in France immediately after the war, 
stressing the political consciousness of those involved.19 In his exhaustive work on the strikes, Andrew 
Rothstein, utilising an impressive array of national and provincial newspapers, detailed the importance 
of the political landscape in encouraging the unrest. Rothstein, also a participant in strikes on Salisbury 
Plain in 1919, was in no doubt of their political motivation and significance.20 In his study of British 
                                                          
16 Fく“く NﾗヴデｴWSｪWが けヱΓヱΑ-ヱΓヱΓ TｴW IﾏヮﾉｷI;デｷﾗﾐゲ aﾗヴ Bヴｷデ;ｷﾐげが Journal of Contemporary History, vol.3, no.4, 1968, 
ヮくヱΓヶき WくLく L;ﾐｪWヴが けTｴW WWﾉﾉ-“ヮヴｷﾐｪ ﾗa O┌ヴ DｷゲIﾗﾐデWﾐデゲげが Journal of Contemporary History, vol.3, no.4, 1968, 
pp.14-5. 
17 C. Wrigley, Lloyd George and the Challenge of Labour; The Post-War Coalition 1918-1922 (Harvester 
WｴW;デゲｴW;aが LﾗﾐSﾗﾐが ヱΓΓヰぶが ヮくヲヴき Cく WヴｷｪﾉW┞が けTｴW ゲデ;デW ;ﾐS デｴW Iｴ;ﾉﾉWﾐｪW ﾗa ﾉ;Hﾗ┌ヴ ｷﾐ Bヴｷデ;ｷﾐ ヱΓヱΑ-ヲヰげが ｷﾐ Cく 
Wrigley (ed.), Challenges of Labour; Central and west Europe 1917-1920 (Routledge, London, 1993), pp.262-3. 
18 Nく M;ﾐゲaｷWﾉSが けTｴW N;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ FWSWヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa DｷゲIｴ;ヴｪWS ;ﾐS DWﾏﾗHｷﾉｷゲWS “ﾗﾉSｷWヴゲ ;ﾐS “;ｷﾉﾗヴゲが ヱΓヱΑ-1921: A View 
aヴﾗﾏ デｴW M;ヴIｴWゲげが Family and Community History, vol.7. no.1, May 2004, p.25. 
19 T. Wintringham, Mutiny: Being a Survey of Mutinies from Spartacus to Invergordon (Lindsay Drummond, 
London, 1936). 
20 A. Rothstein, TｴW SﾗﾉSｷWヴゲげ SデヴｷﾆWゲ ﾗa ヱΓヱΓ (The MacMillan Press, London, 1980). 
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army mutineers, Julian Putkowski points to the fact that nearly 800 British soldiers were arraigned as 
mutineers between 1914 and 1922, and suggests that senior officers lacked a consistent application 
of military law when it came to the demobilisation strikes as so few appear in the registers after the 
Armistice.21 In the most detailed study of unrest during the First World War, Gloden Dallas and Douglas 
Gill point out that officers lost the power of command and that the stability of British society was 
placed in doubt in early 1919. Pointing to the alleged gulf between soldiers and the workers 
ﾏﾗ┗WﾏWﾐデが デｴW┞ Iﾉ;ｷﾏ デｴ;デ デｴW けゲﾗﾉSｷWヴゲげ Sヴ;ﾏ;ゲげ aﾗヴﾏWS H┌デ ; ゲｷSWゲｴﾗ┘ デﾗ ┘ｷSWヴ SWﾏﾗﾐゲデヴ;デｷﾗﾐゲ ﾗa 
unrest.22 This latter point takes it too far. To the authorities, the risk posed by soldiers, and fears of 
デｴW ┘;ヴげゲ brutalising effect on them and society at large, were of great concern, especially because of 
the actions of prominent socialists supported by the Daily Herald.23 On the whole, soldiers and 
institutions such as the press towed the line, as they had done for much of the war, but the system of 
demobilisation and the consequences of its unjust nature placed the continued good discipline of the 
British army in doubt for much of 1919. 
TｴW ﾗHﾃWIデｷ┗W ﾗa デｴｷゲ ;ヴデｷIﾉW ｷゲ デﾗ デヴ;IW デｴW ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげゲ ;Iデｷﾗﾐゲ ｷﾐ ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲW デﾗ デｴWゲW SWﾏﾗHｷﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ 
strikes, how it made an assessment of the risks of politicization, the efforts it made in order to manage 
the situation, and also the press. Moreover, a discussion will be undertaken about the failure of left-
┘ｷﾐｪ ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴゲげ ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐゲ デﾗ ヴWIヴ┌ｷデ ﾏWﾐ デﾗ デｴWｷヴ I;┌ゲW ﾗﾐIW ゲデヴｷﾆWゲ HヴﾗﾆW ﾗ┌デく Uゲｷng a range of 
official documents, newspaper reports, memoirs, and some accounts given by soldiers of the events 
in 1919, the article will ultimately argue that the government misread the situation and overestimated 
the risks of radicalisation, most soldiers simply wishes to return home. 
 
 
                                                          
21 J. Putkowski, British Army mutineers 1914-1922 (Francis Boutle Publishers, London, 1998), p.12. 
22 G. Dallas and D. Gill, The Unknown Army; Mutinies in the British Army in World War I (The Thetford Press, 
Thetford, 1985), p.138. 
23 The Daily Herald had an uneasy relationship with the Labour Party and was much more extreme in its views. 
See S. Koss, The Rise and Fall of The Political Press in Britain; Volume Two: The Twentieth Century (Hamish 
Hamilton, London, 1984), pp.5; 234-5. 
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THE ARMISTICE AND THE FIRST SIGNS OF TROUBLE 
Plans for demobilisation had been under way since 1916 so it was not as if the authorities were 
caught unprepared when the Armistice was signed on 11 November 1918.24 Many soldiers were 
caught by surprise though and, in contrast to the scenes at home, reactions were muted. Captain 
Charles Carrington, future Professor of History at Cambridge University, ヴWI;ﾉﾉWS デｴ;デ け┗ｷIデﾗヴ┞ ┘;ゲ 
sudden and complete and the general sensation was that of awaking from a nightmare.25 Brigadier 
General Percy Crozier, Commander of 119th (Welsh) Brigade), 40th Division, stated that though men 
;ﾐS ┘ﾗﾏWﾐ ;ﾉﾉ ﾗ┗Wヴ デｴW ┘ﾗヴﾉS け┘Wﾐデ ﾏ;Sげが デｴW aighting men fresh from the line thanked God for 
delivery.26 George Jameson even went as far as to say that once the initial shock had subsided, he had 
デｴW aWWﾉｷﾐｪ ﾗa ｴ;┗ｷﾐｪ HWWﾐ ゲ;IﾆWS ;ﾐS ﾆｷIﾆWS ﾗ┌デ ﾗa ; ﾃﾗHが けﾉｷﾆW HWｷﾐｪ ﾏ;SW ヴWS┌ﾐS;ﾐデげく27 Others 
recalled awe, great relief, bewilderment, and shock at the speed of the German collapse.28  It was 
Iﾉ;ｷﾏWS デｴ;デ ; Iﾗﾏﾏﾗﾐ ┗ｷW┘ ｴWﾉS H┞ ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴゲ ┘;ゲ デｴ;デ け┘W Iﾗ┌ﾉS ﾐﾗ┘ ﾉｷ┗W ｴ;ヮヮｷﾉ┞ W┗Wヴ ;aデWヴ ｷﾐ ; さﾉ;ﾐS 
aｷデ aﾗヴ ｴWヴﾗWゲ デﾗ ﾉｷ┗W ｷﾐざ ;ゲ デｴW PヴｷﾏW MｷﾐｷゲデWヴ ｷﾐデWﾐSWSげく29 Rapid demobilisation became a rallying cry 
during the General Election campaign in December.30 Newspapers made the business of 
demobilisation theirs, the Daily Mailが ﾉ;HWﾉﾉｷﾐｪ ｷデゲWﾉa aﾗヴ ﾏ┌Iｴ ﾗa デｴW ┘;ヴ ;ゲ さTｴW “ﾗﾉSｷWヴゲげ P;ヮWヴざが ヴ;ﾐ 
a Iﾗﾉ┌ﾏﾐ WﾐデｷデﾉWS さSｷﾉﾉ┞-S;ﾉﾉ┞ざが ┘ｴｷIｴ ｪ;┗W W┝ｴ;┌ゲデｷ┗W W┝;ﾏヮﾉWゲ ﾗa SWﾏﾗHｷﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ SWﾉ;┞s. In the days 
leading up to the election ｷデ ┘ヴﾗデW けｷデ ゲWWﾏゲ デｴ;デ ﾐﾗ ﾗﾐW ケ┌ｷデW ﾆﾐﾗ┘ゲ ┘ｴ;デ ｷゲ ｴ;ヮヮWﾐｷﾐｪが 
ﾐﾗデ┘ｷデｴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪ デｴW ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉ Hﾗ;ゲデ デｴ;デ SWﾏﾗHｷﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ヮﾉ;ﾐゲ ｴ;┗W HWWﾐ ｷﾐ ｴ;ﾐS aﾗヴ デ┘ﾗ ┞W;ヴゲげく31  
                                                          
24 For early discussions on plans for demobilisation see The Problem of Demobilisation; A Statement and some 
suggestions (Co-Operative Printing Society, London, 1916); Demobilisation as a whole was an administrative 
nightmare に fourteen separate departments were involved, initially headed up by Sir Eric Geddes, see C. Wrigley, 
Lloyd George and the Challenge of Labour, pp.24-9. 
25 C. Carrington, Soldier From the Wars Returning (Hutchinson and Co. Ltd, London, 1965), p.250. 
26 F.P. Crozier, A Bヴ;ゲゲ H;デ ｷﾐ Nﾗ M;ﾐげゲ L;ﾐS (Jonathan Cape, London, 1930), p.232. 
27 IWM Sound Archive, Interview with George Brumwell Jameson, Trooper, 1/1st Northumberland Hussars, 
accession number 7363, 1984. The IWM Sound Archive is collection of over 33,000 recording, compiled 
throughout the 20th century, relating to conflict since 1914. 
28 R. Feilding, War Letters to a Wife; France and Flanders, 1915-1919 (Medici Society, London, 1929), p.357; 
IWM, Interview with Albert Birtwhistle, NCO in 1/6th Btn, East Lancashire Regiment, accession number 11970, 
1991; Interview with Donald Murray, NCO in 8th Btn, King;s Own Yorkshire Light Infantry, accession number 
25548, 1973. 
29 Carrington, Soldier From the Wars Returning, p.250. 
30 The Times, 12 December 1918. 
31 Daily Mail, 9 December 1918. See also 5, 7, 10, 11 December 1918. 
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The authorities had devised a priority system which was driven by the needs of the peacetime 
economy, akin to the draft plan sent to Haig in late 1917. The first soldiers to be released would be 
さSWﾏﾗHｷﾉｷゲWヴゲざが デｴﾗゲW ┘ｴﾗ ヮWヴaﾗヴﾏWS デ;ゲﾆゲ ｷﾐ Iｷ┗ｷﾉｷ;ﾐ ﾉｷaW デｴ;デ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS ゲヮWWS ┌ヮ デｴW SWﾏﾗHilisation of 
ﾗデｴWヴゲく TｴWゲW ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS HW aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘WS H┞ さヮｷ┗ﾗデ;ﾉ ﾏWﾐざが ┘ｴﾗ Iﾗ┌ﾉS ヮヴﾗ┗ｷSW Wﾏヮﾉﾗ┞ﾏWﾐデ aﾗヴ ﾗデｴWヴゲく TｴｷヴSﾉ┞が 
there were so-I;ﾉﾉWS さゲﾉｷヮ ﾏWﾐざが ﾉ;HWﾉﾉWS ;ゲ ゲ┌Iｴ HWI;┌ゲW ﾗa デｴW ゲﾉｷヮゲ ﾗa ヮ;ヮWヴ デｴ;デ ;┌デｴﾗヴｷゲWS デｴWｷヴ 
demobilisation, who could provide proof that they had a job waiting for them upon their return to 
civilian life.32 After these groups, a general demobilisation could occur. However, it was the third 
category of men that was to provide the catalyst for some of the initial unrest in early 1919, for さゲﾉｷヮ 
ﾏWﾐざ ┘WヴWが ﾏﾗヴW ﾗaデWﾐ デｴ;ﾐ ﾐﾗデが デｴﾗゲW ┘ｴﾗ ｴ;S WﾐデWヴWS デｴW ;ヴﾏ┞ ﾉ;デWヴ ﾗﾐ ｷﾐ デｴW ┘;ヴく 
The first major trouble occurred at Folkestone on 3rd January. According to some reports, upwards 
of 10,000 men refused to attend parade, having held a meeting the previous day, and declined to 
embark on boats bound for France. Instead, the large body of men marched to the Town Hall to pay a 
visit to the Mayor of Folkestone. SヮWWIｴWゲ けﾗa ; ﾏﾗSWヴ;デW デﾗﾐWげ ┘WヴW ﾏ;SWが Iﾉ;ｷﾏｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ ﾏ;ﾐ┞ 
applications for demobilisation were being ignored, despite men having jobs waiting for them.33 Some 
participants also claimed resentment towards officers, whose conditions were much more favourable 
compared to those of the men.34 By the evening, the situation had been resolved when military 
officials, with the approval of the War Office, decided that rather than proceed with disciplinary 
ﾏW;ゲ┌ヴWゲ ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ デｴW ﾏWﾐ け┘ｴﾗゲW SｷゲIﾗﾐデWﾐデ ゲWWﾏWS デﾗ ｴ;┗W ;ヴｷゲWﾐ ｷﾐ デｴW ﾏ;ｷﾐ aヴﾗﾏ ｪWﾐ┌ｷﾐW 
ﾏｷゲ┌ﾐSWヴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪげが デｷﾏW ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS HW ｪｷ┗Wﾐ aﾗヴ W┝ヮﾉ;ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐゲく35 The men were dealt with individually, 
those with contracts for work were demobilised, those with contracts which were not yet fully in order 
┘WヴW ヮWヴﾏｷデデWS ;ﾐ ;SSｷデｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ┘WWﾆゲげ ﾉW;┗W デﾗ ;デデWﾐS デﾗ デｴW ﾐWIWゲゲ;ヴ┞ ヮ;ヮWヴ┘ﾗヴﾆが and those with no 
prospects of contracts would return to duty at once. Lord Milner, as Secretary of State for War, wrote 
                                                          
32 “く‘く Gヴ;┌H;ヴSが けMｷﾉｷデ;ヴ┞ DWﾏﾗHｷﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ GヴW;デ Bヴｷデ;ｷﾐ Fﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ デｴW Fｷヴゲデ WﾗヴﾉS W;ヴげが The Journal of Modern 
History, vol.19, no.4, December, 1947, pp.297-311. 
33 A fuller account of the Folkestone Strike can be found in Rothstein, Soldiers Strikes, pp.37-9. See also 
newspaper accounts in The Times, 6 January 1919; Daily Express, 6 January 1919; Daily Mail, 6 January 1919; 
Western Daily Press, 6 January 1919. 
34 Quoted in Dallas and Gill, Unknown Army, p.105. 
35 Western Daily Press, 6 January 1919. 
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デﾗ D;┗ｷS Lﾉﾗ┞S GWﾗヴｪW ゲデ;デｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ デｴWゲW IﾗﾐIWゲゲｷﾗﾐゲ ┘WヴW けデｴW HWゲデ ┘;┞ ﾗ┌デ ﾗa ; H;S H┌ゲｷﾐWゲゲげく36 It 
seemed as if the disturbance was over as quickly as it began, but this leniency would come back to 
haunt the authorities. 
Within twenty-four hours, other strikes swept across the country, beginning in Dover.37 Army 
Service Corps men stationed at Osterley Park, drove to Whitehall to put their case to the Prime 
Minister. One participanデが ; ゲWヴｪW;ﾐデが デﾗﾉS ; ヴWヮﾗヴデWヴ デｴ;デ け┘W ｴ;┗W HWWﾐ ｷﾐaﾗヴﾏWS デｴ;デ ﾗ┌ヴ Hヴ;ﾐIｴ ﾗa 
the service would be the last to be demobilised. Most of us have had over two years in France, and 
ｴ;┗W HWWﾐ ┘ﾗ┌ﾐSWSげく38 In the week following the demonstration at Folkestone, ┌ゲｷﾐｪ ‘ﾗデｴゲデWｷﾐげゲ 
thorough accounts of strikes across Great Britain, a very conservative estimate puts the number of 
soldiers striking as a result of demobilisation delays at over 52,000 (approximately 1.5% of men under 
arms).39 While only a fraction of the total, it is unsurprising that the authorities were concerned. When 
men of the Army Service Corps (ASC) descended on Whitehall from camps on the outskirts of London, 
the Chief of the Imperial General Staff (CIGS), Sir Henry Wilson, wrote to Derby stating that; 
 
The heart of the present troubles in the Army lies in the reckless speeches and promises made during 
the recent elections, and in constant civilian and therefore ignorant and dangerous interference in our 
demobilisation scheme. Exactly where we are drifting to に for we are drifting に I Sﾗﾐげデ ﾆﾐﾗ┘く Aデ デｴW 
present moment there are rows of lorries outside this Office and 1,000 lorrymen up from Kempton with 
SWﾏ;ﾐSゲ ﾗa ゲﾗヴデゲぐOﾐW デｴｷﾐｪ ｷゲ IWヴデ;ｷﾐ デｴ;デ ┌ﾐﾉWゲゲ PぷヴｷﾏWへ MぷMｷﾐｷゲデWヴへ H┌IﾆﾉWゲ デﾗ ;ﾐS ﾏ;ﾆWゲ ｷデ IﾉW;r 
that he and the Government are solid behind the W[ar] O[ffice] and the officers of the Army we shall 
lose the Army, and then the Navy and then the Air Force.40 
 
                                                          
36 Quoted in Wrigley, Lloyd George and the Challenge of Labour, p.27. 
37 Detailed accounts of the many strikes and disturbances may be found in Rothstein, Soldiers Strikes, pp.39-65. 
38 Quoted in Dallas and Gill, Unknown Army, p.106. 
39 Ibid. 
40 Wilson to Derby, 7 January 1919, quoted in K. Jeffery (ed.), The Military Correspondence of Field Marshal Sir 
Henry Wilson 1918-1922 (Army Records Society, London, 1985), pp.73-4. 
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The ignorant civilians to which Wilson referred were undoubtedly elements of the press. When 
reporting the first strikes, the Daily Mailが ┌ﾐSWヴ デｴW ｴW;Sｷﾐｪ さBヴ;ｷﾐﾉWゲゲ DWﾏﾗHｷﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐざが ゲデ;デWS デｴ;デ 
“ｷヴ EヴｷI GWSSWゲ ｴ;S けゲﾗ a;ヴ ゲ┌IIWゲゲa┌ﾉﾉ┞ W┗;SWS デｴW ヴﾗヮW ;ﾐS ﾉ;ﾏヮ-post that are said to await the 
ヮﾗﾉｷデｷIｷ;ﾐ ┘ｴﾗ a;ｷﾉゲ ｷﾐ ｴｷゲ デ;ゲﾆげが ;ﾐS デｴ;デ デｴW さ‘WS T;Hゲざ ┘WヴW ヴWゲヮﾗﾐゲｷHﾉW aﾗヴ デｴW けHﾉ┌ﾐSWヴｷﾐｪげ ;デ 
FﾗﾉﾆWゲデﾗﾐW ;ﾐS WﾉゲW┘ｴWヴWく F┌ヴデｴWヴﾏﾗヴWが デｴ;デ けデｴW ﾉ;Iﾆ ﾗa Hヴ;ｷﾐゲ ;ﾐS ﾗa aﾗヴWゲｷｪｴデ Sｷゲヮﾉ;┞WS H┞ デｴW W;ヴ 
OaaｷIW ｷゲ ｷﾐデWヴaWヴｷﾐｪ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ヴWゲデﾗヴ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ デヴ;SW ;ﾐS ヮヴﾗゲヮWヴｷデ┞げが ;ﾐS デｴ;デ けﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ デﾗ デｴW 
abundant respect which officials have for one another, and their capacity for taking as long as possible 
デﾗ Sﾗ ﾐﾗデｴｷﾐｪが ┘W Sﾗ┌Hデ ┘ｴWデｴWヴ W┗Wﾐ FﾗﾉﾆWゲデﾗﾐW ┘ｷﾉﾉ ヮヴﾗ┗W デﾗ HW ; ゲ┌aaｷIｷWﾐデ ;┘;ﾆWﾐｷﾐｪ デﾗ デｴWﾏげく41  
Some of this criticism was in itself also unjust. After all, according to official figures, even by the 
end of 1918, over 330,000 officers and men had been demobilised.42 This was despite, as one 
Demobilisation Officer recalled, demobilisation デ;ﾆｷﾐｪ ヮﾉ;IW ;IIﾗヴSｷﾐｪ デﾗ ; ヮﾉ;ﾐ ┘ｴｷIｴ けﾗﾐﾉ┞ ; fatuous 
[sic] on army formゲ Iﾗ┌ﾉS ｴ;┗W ｷﾐ┗WﾐデWSげく43 An additional 71,210 had left the armed forces by the end 
of the first week in January, while nearly double that rate, 132,806, had left by 16th January. This 
represented 5.2% of the officers and 12.6% of the other ranks serving on 11th November.44 Even before 
the unrest, these were fairly impressive figures. The fact that a higher rate of other ranks had been 
demobilised, leaving a disproportionate number of officers in service, further demonstrates the 
complex nature of discipline and officer-man relations in the British armed forces immediately after 
the war. If we are to make the valid assertion that discipline was maintained for much of the war 
because of good officer-man relations, then how could a higher proportion of officers translate to 
ヮﾗﾗヴ SｷゲIｷヮﾉｷﾐW ;aデWヴ デｴW ┘;ヴい OﾐW ┘;┞ デﾗ W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐ ｷデ ｷゲ デﾗ デ;ﾆW Cｴ┌ヴIｴｷﾉﾉげゲ SWIﾉ;ヴ;デｷﾗﾐ デｴ;デ ﾏ;ﾐ┞ ﾗa デｴW 
most reliable non-commissioned officers had been prematurely demobilised, leading to a breakdown 
of discipline at a local level.45 This certainly has some validity, but only tells half of the story. It is also 
                                                          
41 Daily Mail, 6 January 1919. 
42 TNA WO32/5242 Memorandum showing the numbers of men demobilised between 11 November 1918 and 
2 January 1919, 7 January 1919. 
43 Feilding, War Letter to a Wife, p.372. 
44 TNA WO32/5248 Letter from the Adjutant General, France, to the Secretary of State for War, 18 January 1919; 
War Cabinet Report on the Weekly Appreciation of Numbers Demobilised, 21 January 1919.  
45 TNA WO32/5242 Memorandum on Demobilisation, 14 January 1919. 
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ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉW デﾗ ヮﾗｷﾐデ デﾗ デｴW a;Iデ デｴ;デ ; ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴゲげ ゲWﾐゲW ﾗa ヮ;デヴｷﾗデｷゲﾏ ;ﾐS ゲWﾉa-sacrifice was no longer 
applicable in this post-war environment.  
 
DAMAGE CONTROL 
Immediately after the wave of strikes, military censors put a stop to most reporting of the 
disturbances across the country, and this clearly had an effect on the stance of the Daily Mail. The day 
;aデWヴ ｷデげゲ ┗ｷデヴｷﾗﾉｷI ;ヴデicle about demobilisation a more moderate article commented, under the 
ｴW;SﾉｷﾐW さ“デW;S┞ぁざ, that; 
 
Aroused at last by the protests of the newspapers and the public, the authorities are taking action to 
remedy the delays and individual injustices of demobilisation. They have met with good-humoured 
demonstrations of the soldiers tactfully and in the right spirit. The men will gain nothing further by 
organised unrest. Their common sense will tell them that any indiscipline will only prejudice the efforts 
to improve and speed-up the machinery.46 
 
While not condemning the men for striking, the tone was clearly one of conciliation, urging men to 
respect authority. For the Sir George Lansbury-owned Herald, however, the tone remained 
belligerent. The strikes were in fact ┘ｴ;デ ｷデゲ aヴﾗﾐデ ヮ;ｪW SWゲIヴｷHWS ;ゲ さTｴW GヴW;デ M┌デｷﾐ┞ざぎ けｷデ ┘;ゲ ゲｴWWヴが 
aﾉ;デが Hヴ;┣Wﾐが ﾗヮWﾐ ;ﾐS ゲ┌IIWゲゲa┌ﾉ ﾏ┌デｷﾐ┞く TｴW┞ ぷデｴW ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴゲへ ﾆﾐW┘ ｷデが ;ﾐS デｴW┞ SｷS ｷデげく Fﾗヴ デｴW 
newspapersげ special correspondent, apparently in Folkestone, this was born as a result of 
ｷﾐIﾗﾏヮヴWｴWﾐゲｷHﾉW aﾗヴﾏゲ ;ﾐS ヴWS デ;ヮWく Tヴ;SW ┌ﾐｷﾗﾐｷゲデゲ ｴ;S HWWﾐ WﾉWIデWS ;ゲ ﾗaaｷIｷ;ﾉゲ aﾗヴ ; ﾐW┘ “ﾗﾉSｷWヴゲげ 
Uﾐｷﾗﾐが ; ヮﾗｷﾐデ ゲデヴWゲゲWS H┞ デｴW ヮ;ヮWヴ けHWI;┌ゲW ﾗa デｴW ;デデWﾏヮデゲ ｷﾐ ゲﾗﾏW ﾗヴｪ;ﾐゲ ﾗa デｴW PヴWゲゲ デﾗ ゲｴﾗ┘ 
the whole movement as one of jealousy towards the organｷゲWS ┘ﾗヴﾆWヴゲ ;デ ｴﾗﾏWげ, and, ultimately, the 
whole movement was a victory for democracy.47 Now was not a time for conciliation, it was time for 
action. D┌ヴｷﾐｪ デｴW aﾗﾉﾉﾗ┘ｷﾐｪ ┘WWﾆが デｴW ヮ;ヮWヴ ﾐﾗデWS ｴﾗ┘ ; けｪヴW;デ ゲｷﾉWﾐIWげ ｴ;S SWゲIWﾐSWS ┌ヮﾗﾐ デｴW 
                                                          
46 Daily Mail, 7 January 1919. 
47 The Herald; The National Labour Weekly, 11 January 1919 (The Daily Herald from March 1919).  
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けC;ヮｷデ;ﾉｷゲデ PヴWゲゲげ. Rather insightfully, articles stated that the troubles had come from the government, 
and that the government press had only themselves to thank. A month previous, they had been 
け┗ﾗIｷaWヴﾗ┌ゲﾉ┞ SWﾐﾗ┌ﾐIｷﾐｪ さDｷﾉﾉ┞ざ ;ﾐS さD;ﾉﾉ┞ざき デｴW PヴｷﾏW MｷﾐｷゲデWヴ ┘;ゲ ヮヴﾗﾏｷゲｷﾐg that things should be 
ゲヮWWSWS ┌ヮげが ;ﾐS デｴ;デ ﾐﾗ┘ デｴW┞ ┘WヴW けゲﾗﾉWﾏﾐﾉ┞ ﾉWIデ┌ヴｷﾐｪ デｴW デヴﾗﾗヮゲ ﾗﾐ デｴW ┗ｷヴデ┌Wゲ ﾗa さﾆWWヮｷﾐｪ 
ゲデW;S┞ざげく48 The HWヴ;ﾉSげゲ rather farfetched solution was for soldiers to organise demobilisation 
themselves. 
Despite claims made by the Herald, feelings of jealousy and frustration do appear to have existed. 
Iﾐ ｴｷゲ ﾏWﾏﾗｷヴが Jﾗｴﾐ J;Iﾆゲﾗﾐ ゲデ;デWS デｴ;デ デｴW デｴﾗ┌ｪｴデ ﾗa ゲﾗ ﾏ;ﾐ┞ ﾗﾉS Iﾗﾏヮ;ﾐｷﾗﾐゲ けｪヴ;S┌;ﾉﾉ┞ S┘ｷﾐSﾉｷﾐｪ 
;┘;┞ aヴﾗﾏ デｴW ヴWｪｷﾏWﾐデ ﾏ;SW デｴW ヴWﾏ;ｷﾐSWヴ ﾗa ┌ゲ aWWﾉ ヴWゲデﾉWゲゲげく49 George Ashurst claimed that the 
vast majority of soldiers got the army out of their minds and simply wished to leave, the thought of 
staying was not favourable.50 ‘ﾗ┘ﾉ;ﾐS FWｷﾉSｷﾐｪ ┘ヴﾗデW デﾗ ｴｷゲ ┘ｷaW ｷﾐ W;ヴﾉ┞ FWHヴ┌;ヴ┞ デｴ;デ けデｴW ヴ;ｪｷﾐｪ 
desire still continues to be demobilised quickly. Nevertheless, I feel pretty sure that, for many, there 
┘ｷﾉﾉ HW ヮ;デｴWデｷI Sｷゲｷﾉﾉ┌ゲｷﾗﾐﾏWﾐデげく51 Even as early as December 1918, William Andrews wrote that it was 
; けｪヴW;デ ｪヴｷW┗;ﾐIW ┘ｷデｴ ┌ゲ デｴ;デ ﾏ┌ﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ ┘ﾗヴﾆWヴゲ ┘WヴW ;デ ﾗﾐIW aヴWWS デﾗ ｪWデ ┘ｴ;デ ﾃﾗHゲ ┘WヴW ﾐﾗ┘ ｪﾗｷng, 
whilst we were kept in the Armyげく F┌ヴデｴWヴﾏﾗヴWが デｴ;デ けﾗﾐW aWWﾉゲ ; ﾉｷデデﾉW ゲ┌ゲヮｷIｷﾗ┌ゲ ﾗa デｴW Aヴﾏ┞ 
authorities. They seem in no hurry to give up their power over the millions of soldiers who have not 
the slightest intention of serving again once they get o┌デ ﾗa ﾆｴ;ﾆｷげく CﾗﾐIﾉ┌Sｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ けデｴﾗ┌ゲ;ﾐSゲ ﾗa 
ﾗaaｷIWヴゲ ｴ;┗W ｴ;S デｴW デｷﾏW ﾗa デｴWｷヴ ﾉｷ┗Wゲ ;ﾐS ;ヴW ゲﾗヴヴ┞ ｷデ ｷゲ ﾐW;ヴｷﾐｪ ;ﾐ WﾐSげく52 
Ministers also began to express their dismay at the attitude of the press, in terms not dissimilar to 
those in the Herald. Winston Churchill, having taken over as Secretary of State for War on 10 January, 
wrote a memorandum on demobilisation and presented it to the War Cabinet four days later. In it he 
ｷﾐSｷI;デWS デｴ;デ デｴW ヮヴWゲゲ ｴ;S HWWﾐ ;ﾉﾉﾗ┘WS デﾗ けヴ┌ﾐ ┘ｷﾉS ﾗﾐ デｴW ゲ┌HﾃWIデ ﾗa SWﾏﾗHｷﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐげ ;ﾐS デｴ;デ 
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ゲデ;デWﾏWﾐデゲ ｴ;S HWWﾐ ﾏ;SW ┘ｷデｴ ﾐﾗ aﾗ┌ﾐS;デｷﾗﾐ ｷﾐ a;Iデく Iﾐ ;Iデ┌;ﾉｷデ┞が ｴW HWﾉｷW┗WS デｴ;デ け;ﾐ ｷﾐaﾉ┌Wﾐデｷ;ﾉ 
part of the press に notably the Daily Mail, Daily Express, and other cheap papers, which circulate 
┘ｷSWﾉ┞ ｷﾐ デｴW Aヴﾏ┞げ ｴ;S ヮ┌HﾉｷゲｴWS ;ヴデｷIﾉWゲ abusing the military authorities and had specifically 
undermined discipline as a result.53 Clearly, now that the Armistice had been signed, the press was no 
longer playing to the fiddle of Lloyd George and his government, as they had for most of the war. The 
press barons, Lords Beaverbrook and Northcliffe, who had directed propaganda for much of the war, 
would have to come back into line and support the government until a new plan could be devised.54 
In a speech at a meeting of the Advisory Committee for the City of London Tribunals, Sir Auckland 
Geddes, the Minister for Reconstruction, even went as far as to urge the press publicly to give the 
work of demobilisation the same consideration and assistance it had extended to the military 
recruiting campaign in 1914-15.55 
According to Churchill, in addition to the abuse levelled at the authorities by the press, there were 
at least six reasons for the disturbing factors which had affected the process of demobilisation. Most 
seriously was the fact that he believed that demobilisation had begun without a final policy or with a 
working machinery. Seemingly, though the civilian authorities had been preparing for demobilisation, 
the military authorities were understandably too preoccupied with the enemy which had lay in front 
of it. Moreover, these two elements, the disorganised system and the hostility from the press, had 
meant that trust had been broken which had led to the disturbances at home, and those which had 
now begun to spread abroad.56 The authorities were required to take action as quickly as possible, 
otherwise a complete disintegration of discipline in the armed forces would occur. 
Within days of his Cabinet memorandum, Churchill presented a new scheme, one which he had 
devised with the help of Wilson and Haig. In fact, he ｴ;S ﾏWデ ┘ｷデｴ Wｷﾉゲﾗﾐ デ┘ﾗ S;┞ゲげ HWaﾗヴW ｴｷゲ C;HｷﾐWデ 
memorandum and the two had discussed the possibility of holding up demobilisation of all men who 
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had served less than two years in France. This would essentially mean that those who had served the 
longest would be released first.57 On 17 January the decision was made: all men who had enlisted in 
1914 and 1915 would be demobilised as soon as transport was available to bring them home に a total 
of 2.2 million men. Furthermore, all men who had joined the army after 1 January 1916 would be 
retained as part of the Armies of Occupation. Importantly, all those retained would be given a pay 
increase and extra leave.58 
In explaining the new scheme to Lloyd George, who was in Parisが Cｴ┌ヴIｴｷﾉﾉ ゲデ;デWS デｴ;デ け┌nder the 
W┝ｷゲデｷﾐｪ ゲIｴWﾏW デｴW SｷゲIｷヮﾉｷﾐW ﾗa デｴW ┘ｴﾗﾉW ;ヴﾏ┞ ｷゲ HWｷﾐｪ ヴﾗデデWSぐI ;ﾏ ┗Wヴ┞ ;ﾐ┝ｷﾗ┌ゲ ;Hﾗ┌デ デｴW ゲデ;デW ﾗa 
デｴW ;ヴﾏ┞が Hﾗデｴ ｷﾐ Fヴ;ﾐIW ;ﾐS ;デ ｴﾗﾏWげく HW HWﾉｷW┗WS デｴ;デ ゲデ;デWﾏWﾐデゲ ﾏ;SW H┞ Lﾉﾗ┞S GWﾗヴｪW ｴ;S SﾗﾐW 
much to calm the situation, and that newspapers ｴ;S けゲWWﾐ デｴW ヴWS ﾉｷｪｴデ ;ﾐS ｴ;┗W HWWﾐ デヴ┞ｷﾐｪ デﾗ ｴWﾉヮ 
;ゲ ﾏ┌Iｴ ;ゲ ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉW ｷﾐゲデW;S ﾗa W┝Iｷデｷﾐｪ SｷゲIﾗﾐデWﾐデげく59 Both Lloyd George and Andrew Bonar Law 
initially rejected the scheme, especially because so many men would be retained and that conscription 
would remain in place に a thorny issue, and one which would need work in order to convince the 
public of its necessity. Lloyd George was also unhappy that such a major decision had been taken 
without his consultation. Churchill, Wilson, and Haig travelled to Paris on 23rd January and finally 
managed to convince him.60 The next hurdle was to convince the public that this was the correct 
course of action. 
The best way to achieve this aim was to obtain the support of the press. On the same day that the 
scheme was presented to the Cabinet, under a pledge of secrecy, Churchill sent full details of it to Lord 
Northcliffe. In W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐｷﾐｪ ｷデが ｴW ゲデ;デWS デｴ;デ ｴW SｷS ﾐﾗデ aW;ヴ デｴW Iﾗ┌ヴゲW ﾗa ゲ┌Iｴ ; ヮﾗﾉｷI┞ けヮヴﾗ┗ｷSWS デｴ;デ ; 
strong lead is given and that the reasons which make each step necessary are fully and frankly 
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58 Ibid., pp.183-4; R. Blake (ed.), The Private Papers of Douglas Haig 1914-1919; being selections from the private 
diary and correspondence of Field-Marshal the Earl Haig of Bemersyde, KT, GCB, OM, etc. (Eyre and 
Spottiswoode, London, 1952), p.350. 
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W┝ヮﾉ;ｷﾐWSげく Uヮﾗﾐ ヴWIWｷ┗ｷﾐｪ these details, Northcliffe instructed his editors to publicise and to support 
デｴW ゲIｴWﾏWが ゲデ;デｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ け;ﾉﾉ ﾏ┞ ﾐW┘ゲヮ;ヮWヴゲ ┘ｷﾉﾉ Sﾗ W┝;Iデﾉ┞ ┘ｴ;デ ┞ﾗ┌ ┘ｷゲｴ ﾗﾐ デｴW ゲ┌HﾃWIデげく61 Churchill 
also met with other correspondents in the last days of January. After the meeting he wrote to Lloyd 
George on 29 Januar┞ぎ けTｴW ﾐW┘ゲヮ;ヮWヴ ﾏWﾐ デﾗﾗﾆ ｷデ ;ﾉﾉ like lambs. A.P. Nicholson [correspondent for 
the Daily News] said he was surprised at the moderation of the figure and that we could get through 
┘ｷデｴ ゲﾗ aW┘ぐE┗Wヴ┞デｴｷﾐｪ ｷゲ デﾗ HW ﾉ;┌ﾐIｴWS デﾗﾏﾗヴヴﾗ┘ ;ﾐS ┘W ﾏ┌ゲデ ;┘;ｷデ デｴW ヴWゲ┌ﾉデげく62  
The new scheme was indeed launched on 30 January and, true to the word of Northcliffe, the Daily 
Mail wholeheartedly supported it, describing it as a date of great importance in the history of the 
army. Iデ ┘Wﾐデ ﾗﾐが けﾐﾗデｴｷﾐｪ ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ ﾏﾗヴW ｴﾗﾐﾗ┌ヴ;HﾉW to our soldiers than the way in which they have 
received the new scheme and the evidence of patience and patriotism which they are giving after their 
ﾏ;ｪﾐｷaｷIWﾐデ IﾗﾐS┌Iデ ﾗﾐ デｴW H;デデﾉWaｷWﾉSげく MﾗヴWﾗ┗Wヴが デｴ;デ デｴW ﾐW┘ ヮヴｷﾗヴｷデ┞ ゲIｴWﾏW H;ゲWS ﾗﾐ ﾉWﾐｪデｴ ﾗa 
service けゲ;デｷゲaｷWゲ デｴW ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴげゲ ｷﾐゲデｷﾐIデｷ┗W ヴWゲヮWIデ aﾗヴ a;ｷヴﾐWゲゲげく63 If soldiers were happy with the scheme 
then how could the public complain? The news, however, had come too late for some soldiers, 
especially those based abroad and, on the day of the announcement, serious trouble broke out in 
Calais. 
 
THE STRIKES SPREAD 
As early as 13 January, a report warned of the serious effect of recent demonstrations in France. 
Once more, the trouble was ascribed to the activities of a few newspapers, principally the Paris edition 
of the Daily Mail, which was readily available for troops to read. The author was of the opinion that, 
coupled with the recent Police Strike, the latest SWﾏﾗﾐゲデヴ;デｷﾗﾐゲ けゲｴﾗ┘ ｴﾗ┘ ; SWデWヴﾏｷﾐWS ﾏｷﾐﾗヴｷデ┞ ﾗa 
W┝デヴWﾏｷゲデゲ I;ﾐ ゲデ;ﾏヮWSW デｴW ケ┌ｷWデ ﾏWﾐ ｷﾐデﾗ ｷﾐゲ┌HﾗヴSｷﾐ;デｷﾗﾐげ, and, interestingly, that the unrest had 
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meant that the demonstrators had forfeited the sympathy of the public.64 This certainly did not 
dampen the proceedings, and on Monday 27 January, a major incident occurred at Calais, involving 
the ASC and Army Ordnance Corps (AOC). These men organised a strike, complaining about their long 
working hours and the poor conditions in the camps. This had merged with the frustrations over the 
ゲﾉﾗ┘ ヮ;IW ﾗa SWﾏﾗHｷﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐが WゲゲWﾐデｷ;ﾉﾉ┞ デｴW け;ｪｷデ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS ｷﾐSｷゲIｷヮﾉｷﾐW ｴ;S ﾉWSが ケ┌ｷデW ケ┌ｷIﾆﾉ┞が デﾗ 
organised unrestげ.65 A けゲWSｷデｷﾗ┌ゲ ゲヮWWIｴげ ┘;ゲ ﾏ;SW H┞ ; ヮヴｷ┗;デWが ┌ヴｪｷng them to do something about 
their working conditions. He was arrested, and from then on things spiralled out of control.66 The men 
went out on parade and when the sergeant major gave the order to move, not a single soldier did as 
there were rumours that the arrested private had been shot.67 These rumours were unfounded and 
the soldier was requisitioned by the striking men who, despite numerous discussions with high-
ranking officers, did not waver in their position. 
The location of the disturbance was significant because thousands of men passed through the 
camps en route to and from the front after periods of leave in Britain, and these men were thus 
brought face to face with the demands of the strikers. Many soon joined them, and some even 
attempted to commandeer boats back to England. The men elected a committee, headed mainly by 
trade unionists and continued their collective disobedience. Haig, now anxious that things did not get 
any further out of control, directed General Byng, the Commander at Calais, to quell the disturbances 
;デ ;ﾉﾉ Iﾗゲデゲ ｷa デｴW┞ ゲヮヴW;S デﾗ デｴW デﾗ┘ﾐ ｷデゲWﾉaが けSｷゲIｷヮﾉｷﾐW ﾏ┌ゲデ HW ﾏ;ｷﾐデ;ｷﾐWSが ;ﾐS ヴｷﾗデWヴゲ ｷa デｴW┞ I;ﾐﾐﾗデ 
be arrested must be shot. Those men who have returned from leave have no ground for complaint 
and appear to have been led astra┞ H┞ BﾗﾉゲｴW┗ｷﾆ ;ｪｷデ;デﾗヴゲげく68  
Eventually, on the morning of 30th January, men of the 105th Brigade, 35th Division, entered the 
camp and surrounded the tents and huts. The men were told that those who wished to break off the 
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66 Rothstein, Soldiers Strikes, p.69. 
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strike could do so with no repercussions. The four-man committee then addressed the men and urged 
them to continue, but they were ignored. They were arrested as they tried to discourage defectors.69 
The strike was over, relatively quickly, and without having to resort to violence に machine gun 
companies had been brought up to surround the camp, and were even located in the camp offices 
ready to fire upon the strikers. It is clear that that there was a mismatch here between the politics of 
the ringleaders and the mass of the men involved, but what the strike demonstrates is how quickly 
discipline could break down when men were removed from their units. Unrest at Etaples in 1917 had 
partially been attributed to this, along with the poor quality of food and accommodation on offer.70  
The ringleaders of the Calais unrest were imprisoned for various terms, this despite the insistence 
by Haig that they should be shot. Churchill was adamant that the death penalty should not be resorted 
to unless there was serious bloodshed. Haig wrote in his diary that he had けヮﾗ┘Wヴが H┞ W;ヴヴ;ﾐデが デﾗ デヴ┞ 
by Court Martial and shoot in accordance with [the] Army Act; and no telegram from the Secretary of 
“デ;デW I;ﾐ ;aaWIデ ﾏ┞ ヴｷｪｴデ デﾗ Sﾗ ┘ｴ;デ I デｴｷﾐﾆ ｷゲ ﾐWIWゲゲ;ヴ┞ aﾗヴ デｴW Aヴﾏ┞げく71 The military authorities were 
shaken by the events, especially because they occurred at the same time as major strikes in Belfast 
and on the Clyde, but Churchill remained of the opinion that the unrest had occurred as a hangover 
from the previous demobilisation scheme.72 No unrest occurred on this scale again, but it did not mean 
that it ceased completely, especially amongst service units, whose men were more class conscious in 
their outlook. 
Using the General Courts Martial Registers, Julian Putkowski has argued that the majority of 
prosecutions seem to have been made against men in infantry units.73 This assessment is problematic, 
however, as it does not correspond with the number of incidents reported both in the press and by 
Military Intelligence, and indicates a seeming inability or unwillingness by the authorities to formally 
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prosecute many of those involved in unrest. This discontent in early 1919 continued to manifest itself 
through collective action, but also through the actions of individuals. At a meeting at the YMCA Club 
in Ecclestone Square, London, attended by 600 soldiers, a sergeant of the ASC made a speech of a 
け┗Wヴ┞ ｷﾐaﾉ;ﾏﾏ;デﾗヴ┞げ ﾐ;デ┌ヴWが ゲデ;デｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ けｷa ┞ﾗ┌ ﾏWﾐ ｷﾐ ┌ﾐｷaﾗヴﾏ ┘ｷﾉﾉ IﾗﾏHｷﾐW ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ┘ﾗヴﾆWヴゲが ┘W ┘ｷﾉﾉ 
デｴWﾐ HW デｴW ゲデヴﾗﾐｪWゲデ ヮ;ヴデ┞ ｷﾐ デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞げく74 Soldier mechanics at a depot in Bristol went on strike 
complaining about their retention in the armed forces.75 Royal Engineers who had been employed as 
telegraphists and seconded to the Post Office, threatened a strike at having been kept under military 
discipline and in poor accommodation.76 These examples, though seemingly minor, caused a great 
deal of concern, especially because of their apparent left wing character. All of these incidents, 
however, are missing from the General Courts Martial Registers. When looking at the increase in 
educational provision in the British Army immediate after the war, S.P. Mackenzie has argued that this 
IﾗﾐIWヴﾐ ﾗ┗Wヴ ﾏWﾐげゲ ;デデｷデ┌SWゲ けデｴW ヮ;デWﾐデ aW;ヴ デｴ;デ BﾗﾉゲｴW┗ｷゲﾏ ;ﾐS ヴ;SｷI;ﾉｷゲﾏ ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉﾉ┞ ┘WヴW 
ヮWヴﾏW;デｷﾐｪ デｴW ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴげゲ IﾗﾐゲIｷﾗ┌ゲﾐWゲゲ デﾗ H;S effect, can best be understood if note is taken of the 
apparently volatile socio-ヮﾗﾉｷデｷI;ﾉ Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ;aデWヴ デｴW ┘;ヴげく77 Therefore, strikes in the army could not be 
viewed in isolation. There was widespread industrial unrest across the country, and fears of 
BoﾉゲｴW┗ｷゲﾏげゲ ゲヮヴW;S ;Iヴﾗゲゲ E┌ヴﾗヮW ｴWﾉS ﾏ┌Iｴ ┘Wｷｪｴデ ;ﾏﾗﾐｪ IWヴデ;ｷﾐ ヮﾗﾉiticians. Though easy to 
dismiss as an exaggerated fear a century later, to the establishment, a breakdown in military discipline 
was a potential symptom of Bolshevism, and it was treated as such.  
 
UNREST CONTINUES 
It has been claimed that, ┘ｷデｴ Cｴ┌ヴIｴｷﾉﾉげゲ ﾐW┘ SWﾏﾗHｷﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ゲIｴWﾏWが ┌ﾐrest in the army came to 
a halt, but it certainly continued. Much of the blame was attributed to the Herald League, its political 
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organ, the Daily Herald, and デｴW ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴゲげ ┌ﾐｷﾗﾐ ﾏﾗゲデ ;ゲゲﾗIｷ;デWS ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ﾉ;デデWヴが デｴW “;ｷﾉﾗヴゲげが “ﾗﾉSｷWヴゲが 
;ﾐS AｷヴﾏWﾐげゲ Uﾐｷﾗﾐ ふ““AUぶく The Daily Herald remained most aloof of the establishment, and 
continued to print articles critical of the authorities in their demobilisation plans. In February, it 
launched a personal attack on Churchill, stating that; 
 
Winston Churchill is at it again, Antwerp did not teach him his lesson; Gallipoli did not teach him his lesson; 
and now the great unrest in the army and the demonstrations it has caused are apparently leaving him 
untaught and unrepentant...Things seemed to quieten down. But indeed it was not more than seeming. 
Churchill did not remedy the grievances of the men; but someone saw to it that the press was muzzled. 
TｴW Cｴ┌ヴIｴｷﾉﾉ ┘;┞ ﾗa I┌ヴｷﾐｪ ; デﾗﾗデｴ;IｴW ｷゲ ﾐﾗデ デﾗ ﾉWデ デｴW IｴｷﾉSげゲ Iヴ┞ HW ｴW;ヴSく78 
 
The article went on to describe various examples of continued unrest, the majority undertaken by 
skilled men and trade unionists, citing a demonstration by mechanics at Kempton Park as the largest 
example. It also mentioned the soldiersげ many demands, including faster demobilisation, no 
IﾗﾐゲIヴｷヮデｷﾗﾐが ; ヴWIﾗｪﾐｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴゲげ IﾗﾏﾏｷデデWWゲが ;ﾐS ; ヮヴﾗﾏｷゲW ﾐﾗデ デﾗ ┌ゲW ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴゲ aﾗヴ ゲデヴｷﾆW 
breaking. Finally, ｷデ ;ゲﾆWSぎ けAﾐS ┘ｴ;デ ｷゲ Cｴ┌ヴIｴｷﾉﾉげゲ ;ﾐゲ┘Wヴい Fｷ┝WS H;┞ﾗﾐWデゲ ｷﾐ WｴｷデWｴ;ﾉﾉき デｴW ;ヴヴWゲデ ﾗa 
さヴｷﾐｪﾉW;SWヴゲざき デｴヴW;デゲ デﾗ SWaWヴ SWﾏﾗHｷﾉｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐ ;ﾐS デﾗ ゲデﾗヮ デｴW さｪヴW;デ ヮヴｷ┗ｷﾉWｪWざ ﾗa ﾉW;┗Wく79 
In particular, the Daily Herald sponsored SSAU was viewed upon with great concern. In one report 
ｷデ ┘;ゲ ヴWaWヴヴWS デﾗ ;ゲ ; け┗Wヴ┞ ;Iデｷ┗W ;ﾐS ﾏｷゲIｴｷW┗ﾗ┌ゲ HﾗS┞げ ┘ｴｷIｴ, by March 1919, was becoming bolder 
in its actions. Most troubling for those in charge was the fact that it had invited serving soldiers to 
become honorary members. Service regulations had prevented soldiers from joining veteransげ 
organisations during the war. However, the Comrades of the Great War, an organisation formed under 
Lord Derby in 1917, had permitted honorary membership, setting a precedent. The SSAU had also 
                                                          




issued leaflets urging soldiers not to interfere in Labour disturbances.80 By the beginning of April, Sylvia 
Pankhurst was reported to have made a number of speeches regarding serving soldiers, some of which 
were so inflammatory that calls were made for her arrest. In one such speech, made to the Labour 
Cﾉ┌H ｷﾐ ‘┌ｪH┞が ゲｴW ゲ;ｷS けｷデ ｷゲ ｴﾗヮWa┌ﾉ デｴ;デ デｴW ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴゲ ;ﾐS ゲ;ｷﾉﾗヴゲ ;ヴW HWｪｷﾐﾐing to feel the spirit of 
revolt, because if we get the soldiers, sailors and policemen with us we shall be able to take control of 
デｴW Iﾗ┌ﾐデヴ┞ ┗Wヴ┞ ケ┌ｷIﾆﾉ┞ ;ﾐS ┘ｷデｴﾗ┌デ HﾉﾗﾗSゲｴWSげく81 In the same report, it was conveyed that the SSAU 
had established itself as a definite branch of the Herald League and that it would be used as cover for 
tampering with the loyalty of sailors and soldiers.82 Its demands were circulated widely in the Daily 
Herald, and it even published its own periodical, The Forces, which lasted for three editions. Its 
demands were simple: an increase in military pensions; the recognition of unions in the army and 
navy; and a pledge not to use servicemen as strike-breakers.83 
The government response to its デｴヴW;デ ┘;ゲ ゲ┘ｷaデ ;ﾐS SWIｷゲｷ┗Wく A けSｷヴデ┞ デヴｷIﾆゲげ I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐ, using 
counter-propaganda, was instigated by the intelligence services which aimed at discouraging 
servicemen from joining its ranks.84 Very quickly reports circulated which indicated a decline in the 
threat of the SSAU, as well as of other けW┝デヴWﾏWげ ﾗヴｪ;ﾐｷゲ;デｷﾗﾐゲが ゲ┌Iｴ ;ゲ デｴW N;デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ Uﾐｷﾗﾐ ﾗa E┝-
Servicemen, and the International Union of Ex-Servicemen.85 By the end of April, it was reported that 
the SSAU was not prospering financially, nor was it winning members amongst serving soldiers and 
sailors.86 In home intelligence summaries, officers had been specifically asked about the spread of 
unionism in the army, such was the concern. By the end of May, in the London District, an area which 
                                                          
80 TNA CAB24/76/77 Fortnightly Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom, 10 March 1919. 
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81 TNA CAB24/77/93 Fortnightly Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom, 7 April 1919. 
82 Ibid. 
83 “く‘く W;ヴSが けIﾐデWﾉﾉｷｪWﾐIW “┌ヴ┗Wｷﾉﾉ;ﾐIW ﾗa Bヴｷデｷゲｴ E┝-Servicemen, 1918-ヱΓヲヰげが The Historical Journal, vol.16, no.1, 
1973, p.184. 
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1991, pp.31-2. 
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86 TNA CAB24/78/95 Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom, 30 April 1919. 
22 
 
had seen much union activity, it was reported that unionｷゲﾏ ｷﾐ デｴW ;ヴﾏ┞ けｷゲ ﾐﾗデ IﾗﾐゲｷSWヴWS デﾗ HW 
ｪ;ｷﾐｷﾐｪ ;ﾐ┞ ;ヮヮヴWIｷ;HﾉW ｪヴﾗ┌ﾐS ;ﾏﾗﾐｪ ゲWヴ┗ｷﾐｪ ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴゲげく87 
N;デ┌ヴ;ﾉﾉ┞が デｴW けSｷヴデ┞ デヴｷIﾆゲげ I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐ ｴ;S ;ﾐ ;S┗WヴゲW WaaWIデ ﾗﾐ whether serving and former soldiers 
joined certain unions. However, the lWaデげゲ ヴWﾉ;デｷﾗﾐゲｴｷヮ ;ﾐd historical uneasiness with the armed forces 
must also be recognised, and for a number of reasons. First, prior to the outbreak of war in 1914, 
many British socialists formulated their socialism within a construct of the nation, i.e. that national 
identity meant the acceptance of the belief that English history was a long struggle for liberty に the 
British had a distinct national character and, therefore, British socialism was evolutionary, non-violent, 
and above all parliamentary. This required a more conゲWヴ┗;デｷ┗W ┗ｷW┘ ﾗa デｴW けﾐ;デｷﾗﾐげが H┌デ ｷデ ;ﾉゲﾗ ﾏW;ﾐデ, 
according to Paul Ward, デｴ;デ デｴW ﾉWaデげゲ ┗Wヴゲｷﾗﾐ ﾗa BヴｷデｷゲｴﾐWゲゲ ;ﾐSが デｴWヴWfore, patriotism, was at odds 
with the bellicose, jingoistic version of imperialism, an element so important to many when choosing 
to serve in the armed forces once war had been declared.88 In contrast, David Swift has recently argued 
that ゲﾗIｷ;ﾉｷゲﾏ ;ﾐS ヮ;デヴｷﾗデｷゲﾏ Iﾗ┌ﾉS ;ﾉゲﾗ ゲｷデ デﾗｪWデｴWヴが ゲデ;デｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ けｷﾐ デｴW Iﾉｷﾏ;デW ﾗa ヱΓヱヴ-18 they could 
by unapologetically patriotic, and use that patrｷﾗデｷゲﾏ デﾗ ｷﾐSｷIデ デｴW ｪﾗ┗WヴﾐﾏWﾐデげく89 Though Ward has 
argued that the leftげs use of the language of patriotism immediately after the war had been damaged 
since such language had been devalued by its use in wartime by employers, politicians and trade union 
leaders in order to discourage industrial action.90 Some had to realign themselves to a more radical 
stance, which increasingly took on a Bolshevik character. This element sat uneasily with those such as 
Ramsay MacDonald, and more moderate elements of the Labour Party. It is unsurprising, then, that 
;ゲ デｴW ﾉWaデげゲ ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ デﾗ ┌デｷﾉｷゲW ヮ;デヴｷﾗデｷゲﾏ ;ゲ ; ┘;┞ デﾗ a┌ヴデｴWヴ デｴWｷヴ I;┌ゲW SｷﾏｷﾐｷゲｴWSが ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴゲ ;ﾐS ゲ;ｷﾉﾗヴゲ 
began to reject it, choosing instead to continue to think of patriotism in their own terms, espousing 
                                                          
87 TNA AIR1/556/16/15/50 Intelligence Summary Part II, London District, 28 May 1919. 
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self-ゲ;IヴｷaｷIW ;ﾐS SWaWﾐIW ﾗa ﾗﾐWげゲ ｴﾗﾏWが WﾉWﾏWﾐデゲ which had been advocated by propaganda 
throughout the First World War.91 
“WIﾗﾐSﾉ┞が ;ﾐSが ヮWヴｴ;ヮゲ ﾏﾗヴW ゲｷﾏヮﾉ┞が デｴW ﾉWaデげゲ ｴｷstorical dislike for the armed forces must be taken 
in to account. David Swift has suggested that disdain for the soldier was not apparent in the language 
of the labour movement during the war.92 Conversely, as David Englander and James Osborne have 
argued, before the First World War, the left viewed the soldier with traditional IﾗﾐデWﾏヮデが けゲﾗﾉSｷWヴｷﾐｪ 
remained a dead-end occupation, and the army a colonial gendarmerie unfit for any role in collective 
ゲWI┌ヴｷデ┞ W┝IWヮデ ;ｪ;ｷﾐゲデ ; ﾏｷﾐﾗヴ ヮﾗ┘Wヴげく93 Furthermore, even during the war, the labour movement 
a;ｷﾉWS デﾗ ヮヴﾗﾃWIデ ｷデゲWﾉa ;ゲ デｴW ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴげゲ aヴｷWﾐSく Eﾐｪﾉ;ﾐSWヴ ｴ;ゲ ;ヴｪ┌WS デｴ;デ デｴｷゲ ┘;ゲ ; ヴWaﾉWIデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ;ﾐ 
almost congenital inability to differentiate the old from the new armies, and that it was the 
Independent Labour Parデ┞ ふILPぶが ┘ｴｷIｴ ｴ;S HWWﾐ ﾏﾗゲデ ;Iデｷ┗W ｷﾐ ヮヴﾗﾏﾗデｷﾐｪ ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴげゲ ヴｷｪｴデゲ デｴヴﾗ┌ｪｴﾗ┌デ 
the war, that suffered from this problem most acutely. In 1915, a proposal was made at the annual 
conference to push for the formation of military trade unions, and was rejected on the grounds that 
it might make soldiering a respectable profession. Labour had implied that servicemen were 
contemptible outcasts, for whom they held no brief.94 This lay at the root ﾗa ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴげゲ ｷﾐ;Hｷﾉｷデ┞ デﾗ デヴ┌ゲデ 
the trade union movement in 1919, why would they trust organisations which historically held such 
distasteful views of them? 
Throughout the middle of 1919 there are many examples of a backlash towards the trade union 
ﾏﾗ┗WﾏWﾐデげゲ attempts to enlist support from serving soldiers. Intelligence reports from across the 
country consistently point to the fact that, despite their best attempts, ex-servicemen unions had no 
success in attracting honorary members.95 A man in the Royal Army Service Corps (RASC) had visited 
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93 Dく Eﾐｪﾉ;ﾐSWヴ ;ﾐS Jく OゲHﾗヴﾐWが けJ;Iﾆが Tﾗﾏﾏ┞が ;ﾐS HWﾐヴ┞ D┌HHぎ デｴW AヴﾏWS FﾗヴIWゲ ;ﾐS デｴW Wﾗヴﾆｷﾐｪ Cﾉ;ゲゲげが The 
Historical Journal, vol.23, no.3, 1978, p.620. 
94 Eﾐｪﾉ;ﾐSWヴが けThe National Union of Ex-“Wヴ┗ｷIWﾏWﾐ ;ﾐS デｴW L;Hﾗ┌ヴ Mﾗ┗WﾏWﾐデげが ヮくヲヶく 
95 TNA AIR1/556/16/15/50 Intelligence Summary Part II, Tyne Garrison, 26 May to 1 June 1919; Intelligence 
Summary Part II, Northern Command, 2 to 8 June 1919; Intelligence Summary Part II, Nottingham Garrison, June 
1919; Intelligence Summary Part II, Scottish Command, 1 to 7 June 1919. 
24 
 
a camp to enlist support in the SSAU in late May, but was forced to retire as a result of the reception 
he had met.96 E┗Wﾐ デｴﾗゲW ┘ｴﾗ ｴ;S ;ﾉヴW;S┞ HWWﾐ SｷゲIｴ;ヴｪWS ;ﾐS ┘WヴW ;Iデｷ┗W ﾏWﾏHWヴゲ ﾗa ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴげゲ 
unions appear to have been resolute in their attitude towards the labour movement. Though a less 
extreme organisation, members of the National Federation of Discharged and Demobilized Sailors and 
Soldiers, which had even put up candidates in the 1918 General Election, rejected calls at its 
conference to ally itself to a socialist political body. The ｷﾐデWﾉﾉｷｪWﾐIW ゲ┌ﾏﾏ;ヴ┞ ｷﾐSｷI;デWS デｴ;デ けｷデ ｷゲ 
ゲ;デｷゲa;Iデﾗヴ┞ デｴ;デ デｴW ヴWゲ┌ﾉデゲぐﾗa デｴW IﾗﾐaWヴWﾐIW ヮﾗｷﾐデ デﾗ デｴW a;Iデ デｴ;デ デｴW W┝-servicemen desire to stand 
alone and, by a majority in every case, have testified their determination to refuse to become the 
tools of ┌ﾐヮヴｷﾐIｷヮﾉWS ;ﾐS ヮヴﾗaWゲゲｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ;ｪｷデ;デﾗヴゲげく Iデ ┘Wﾐデ ﾗﾐ デﾗ IﾗﾐIﾉ┌SW デｴ;デ けデｴW ;デデｷデ┌SW ﾗa デｴW ゲﾗﾉSｷWヴ 
is improving every day. Despite the attempt by agitators to cajole and flatter him to become disloyal 
to his sovereign and the tool of revolutionaries as represented by the Herald League, the soldier is 
ヴW;ﾉｷゲｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ デｴWゲW ヮWﾗヮﾉW ;ヴW ﾐﾗデ ｴｷゲ aヴｷWﾐSゲ H┌デ ヴ;デｴWヴ ｴｷゲ WﾐWﾏｷWゲげく97 “ﾗﾉSｷWヴげゲ SｷゲIﾗﾐデWﾐデ ┘;ゲ W┗Wヴ 
present, but it was not easily politicised. 
 
THE HERALD LEAGUE CAMPAIGN FAILS 
It was the Herald League, and its political organ the Daily Herald which, once more, had been 
responsible for a number of serious attempts to undermine discipline and promote its cause in the 
spring and early summer of 1919. The 11th May was a significant date for men who had agreed, under 
the Derby scheme enacted before the introduction of conscription, to serve in the armed forces for 
the duration of the war, and for no longer than six months after its cessation. The authorities had been 
made aware of a SSAU plan for soldiers to demobilise themselves at this point, six months after the 
signing of the Armistice. What began as a rumour amongst soldiers in Paris, had spiralled into 
け;ｪｷデ;デﾗヴゲげ ;S┗ｷゲｷﾐｪ ﾏWﾐ ┘ｴﾗ ｴ;S WﾐﾉｷゲデWS ┌ﾐSWヴ デｴW ゲIｴWﾏW デﾗ デ;ﾆW ﾗaa デｴWｷヴ Huttons, shoulder straps 
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Federation of Discharged and Demobilised Soldiers and Sailors, p.23. 
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and badges, and declare that they had automatically become civilians. It was hoped, it was reported, 
that the government would resort to force and so precipitate a revolution.98 However, the authorities 
were on top of things, and the ““AUげゲ ;S┗ﾗI;I┞ aﾗヴ ゲ┌Iｴ ;ﾐ ｷゲゲ┌W ｪ;┗W an excuse to take action. As 
Chris Wrigley has argued, the encouragement of the SSAU gave the government the opportunity to 
discredit and disorganise a body which was not felt to be strong but which was deemed to contain a 
けBﾗﾉゲｴW┗ｷﾆ WﾉWﾏWﾐデげく99 Its offices, located in the same premises as the Daily Herald, were raided and 
paperwork confiscated. In its publication, the newspaper claimed that the remedy for any grievance 
ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS HW けﾗヴSWヴWSが Iﾗﾐゲデｷデ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ﾉ ;ｪｷデ;デｷﾗﾐげが ;ﾐd this is exactly what the Derby men should be doing, 
ultimately because men were being kept in the armed forces against the terms of their contract.100 
Three days after the raid on SSAU and the Daily Herald offices, the Cabinet were told that evidence 
suggested that the plot was widespread, that H.T. McDonald, a leading figure in the SSAU, intended 
デﾗ ｪﾗ ┘ｷデｴ ESWﾐ P;┌ﾉが デｴW けﾐﾗデﾗヴｷﾗ┌ゲ ヴW┗ﾗﾉ┌デｷﾗﾐ;ヴ┞ ゲヮW;ﾆWヴげが デﾗ Gヴﾗ┗W P;ヴﾆ ;ﾐS Hヴｷﾐｪ ; SｷゲﾗヴSWヴﾉ┞ 
demonstration to Whitehall. Although 800 men of the RASC had threatened to demobilise themselves 
on the 12th, owing to the effective steps taken by the military authorities, and the fact that publicity 
had been given to the movement in the press, it collapsed. Additionally, despite claiming that the plan 
┘;ゲ ; けI;ヴWa┌ﾉﾉ┞ ヮﾉ;ﾐﾐWS ;ﾐS IﾉW┗Wヴﾉ┞ W┝WI┌デWS ﾏ;ﾐﾗW┌┗ヴWげが デｴW Daily Herald had gone quiet on the 
subject for fear that its connection with the movement might damage its circulation.101 The press, 
once more, undoubtedly aided the authorities in disrupting the movement. The plans had been 
published in newspapers on 9th May, while the Daily Mail, still towing the line on demobilisation, 
ゲデ;デWS デｴ;デ ;ヴデｷIﾉWゲ ｷﾐ デｴW ヮヴWゲゲ ｴ;S ｴ;S ; けIﾗﾗﾉｷﾐｪ WaaWIデ ┌ヮﾗﾐ デｴW ｴﾗデｴW;Sゲ ┘ｴﾗ ｴ;┗W HWWﾐ デrying to 
ゲデｷヴ ┌ヮ デｴW DWヴH┞ ﾏWﾐ デﾗ SWﾏﾗHｷﾉｷゲW デｴWﾏゲWﾉ┗Wゲげく102  
Within days, the Daily Herald resumed its fight, this time publishing details of an official circular 
sent from the War Office to all Commanding Officers (COs) ┌ﾐSWヴ デｴW デｷデﾉW さTヴ;SW Uﾐｷﾗﾐｷゲﾏ ;ﾐS the 
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Aヴﾏ┞ざく The document asked COs whether they believed their troops would be loyal enough to assist 
in strike-breaking, they would be willing to serve in Russia, and if there had been a growth in trade 
unionism among them.103 The disclosure of this circular increased the circulation of the newspaper 
;ﾐS ｴ;S ┌ﾐSﾗﾐW けﾏ┌Iｴ ﾗa デｴW ｪﾗﾗS ┘ﾗヴﾆ ┘ｴｷIｴ ｴ;ゲ HWWﾐ SﾗﾐW H┞ ヮヴﾗヮ;ｪ;ﾐS;げく Iデ ┘;ゲ HWﾉｷW┗WS デｴ;デ 
the working man and soldiers were to be used to break strikes and that the government was hostile 
to trade unions.104 The fact that the Guards Division had been brought back and paraded in London in 
March, potentially as a warning that seditious actions would be met by force, did little to appease 
fears.105 It was later discovered that the confidential circular had been stolen on 13th March, and that 
the Daily Herald was offering inducements to persons employed in the War Office to steal other 
documents.106 Military intelligence were confident about the future; 
 
The outlook is certainly growing brighter, in spite of the continual effort of the Daily Herald and the Herald 
League to increase the spread of their dangerous dogmas in the army, there is daily less and less interest 
ゲｴﾗ┘ﾐ ｷﾐ デｴWﾏ H┞ デｴW ゲWヴ┗ｷIWﾏWﾐく OﾐW I;┌ゲWぐｷゲ デｴ;デ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ｪヴ;S┌;ﾉ Wﾉｷﾏｷﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ ﾗa デｴW デWﾏヮﾗヴ;ヴ┞ 
soldier by demobilisation and discharge, men who are largely imbued with unionism tinged with socialism, 
and who enlisted not from liking for the life of a soldier but from a sense of duty; naturally carried with 
them into the service the cult of trade unionism, and in some cases the propaganda of class warfare, and 
of course naturally spread their belief in the Barrack Room. Certainly it is encouraging to find that it is an 
undoubted fact that the influence of the union is a waning one.107 
  
It was discovered that the newspaper was also supplied to the British Expeditionary Force (BEF), 
aヴWW ﾗa Iｴ;ヴｪWが ;ﾐS ┘;ゲ ﾆﾐﾗ┘ﾐ SWヴｷゲｷ┗Wﾉ┞ ;ゲ さTｴW BﾗﾉゲｴW┗ｷﾆ B┌ﾉﾉざく108 It was found that the newspaper 
was sold across northern France, including at Dunkirk, Etaples, Calais, Amiens, Paris, and Boulogne.109 
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105 Carrington, Soldier From the Wars Returning, p.256. 
106 TNA CAB24/93/99 Confidential Special Report ﾗﾐ デｴW さD;ｷﾉ┞ HWヴ;ﾉSざが ヲヵ Nﾗ┗WﾏHWヴ ヱΓヱΓく 
107 TNA AIR1/556/16/15/50 Intelligence Summary Part II, No. 5 Area, Woolwich, 24 May 1919. 
108 TNA CAB24/80/5 Report on Revolutionary Organisations in the United Kingdom, 21 May 1919. 
109 TNA CAB24/81/17 Ibid. 4 June 1919. 
27 
 
It also transpired that the War Office was itself purchasing up to 60,000 copies using canteen funds. 
By the middle of June, the paper had modified its position, claiming that it played no part in persuading 
Derby men to demobilise, appearing to show that it had lost much ground within the forces. 
Nﾗデ┘ｷデｴゲデ;ﾐSｷﾐｪが ｷデ ┘;ゲ ﾏ;ｷﾐデ;ｷﾐWS デｴ;デ けデｴWヴW ｷゲ ┌ﾐSﾗ┌HデWS W┗ｷSWﾐIW デｴ;デ デｴW Daily Herald is doing 
mischief to the morale of the troops serving in France, not only on the Lines of Communication but in 
デｴW Aヴﾏ┞ ﾗa OII┌ヮ;デｷﾗﾐく Ia ヮﾗゲゲｷHﾉWが デｴW W┝ヮﾗヴデ ﾗa デｴｷゲ ヮ;ヮWヴ ゲｴﾗ┌ﾉS HW ヮヴW┗WﾐデWSげく110 Finally, on 8th 
July, Churchill announced in Parliament that circulation of the paper would be stopped, though it 
would not be banned. Formal representations had been received from the GOC, the Army on the 
Rhine, and Douglas Haig, which asserted that the circulation of the Daily Herald had done much harm 
to the discipline of the army and that many incidents of unrest could be directly attributed to it. By 
this time, there was considerable opposition to the paper on the part of the majority of soldiers serving 
both at home and abroad.111 The trade union element of the armed forces had clearly subsided, but it 
did not entirely stop strikes and unrest. 
Throughout the summer, incidents continued to take place which risked the improving state of 
discipline. Once again, soldiers refused to embark for overseas at Dover, and over 1,800 men mutinied 
at the Eastern Command Labour Centre at Sutton. The latter were also concerned that they were to 
be sent overseas. In both of these cases, it would seem that there was still concern that they would 
be sent to Russia.112 In August, seventeen men of the 3rd West Yorkshire Regiment were sentenced by 
Iﾗ┌ヴデ ﾏ;ヴデｷ;ﾉ デﾗ ﾐｷﾐW ﾏﾗﾐデｴゲげ ｷﾏヮヴｷゲﾗﾐﾏWnt with hard labour. In July, they had refused to obey an 
order to parade in fighting equipment. They claimed that they had taken heart at an expression used 
by the company sergeant major in passing the order, and that now peace was declared, they 
considered themselves as civilians. When questioned about the incident, the sergeant major denied 
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┌ゲｷﾐｪ IWヴデ;ｷﾐ W┝ヮヴWゲゲｷﾗﾐゲが ゲデ;デｷﾐｪ デｴ;デ ｴW ｴ;S ﾐﾗデ I;ﾉﾉWS デｴWﾏ さH;ゲデ;ヴSゲざが H┌デ ｴ;S ｷﾐ ;Iデ┌;ﾉ a;Iデ ゲ;ｷS 
that they were a lot of Bolshevists.113 
An increase in unrest was recorded because Derby men feared that they were to be sent east, 
either to India or Russia に and the Daily Herald continued its campaign in support of these men, formed 
ﾏﾗヴW ┘ｷSWﾉ┞ ;ゲ ヮ;ヴデ ﾗa デｴWｷヴ さH;ﾐSゲ ﾗaf ‘┌ゲゲｷ;ざ I;ﾏヮ;ｷｪﾐ. The War Office moved quickly to declare 
that it would not be going back on its word and that demobilisation would occur without them being 
sent east. This latest spate of unrest prompted one newspaper editorial to declare; 
 
The recurrence of incidents that indicate the presence in the army of a good deal of unrest is much to be 
ヴWｪヴWデデWSぐI デｴｷﾐﾆ デｴWヴW ｷゲ ; デWﾐSWﾐI┞ デﾗ W┝;ｪｪWヴ;デW デｴW H┌ﾉﾆが ;ゲ ┘Wﾉﾉ ;ゲ デﾗ ﾏｷゲヴWヮヴWゲWﾐデ デｴW Iｴ;ヴ;IデWヴが ﾗa 
the grievances which have led some soldiers to demonstrate in a manner not consistent with discipline. 
The British soldier is no Bolshevik, and now that he has every reason to believe that there is no intention 
to treat him other than fairly in the matters as to which he has felt uneasy.114 
 
Clearly, both the authorities and the public continued to fear the possibility of unrest. This is hardly 
surprising, as we have already seen, the fear of Bolshevism is crucial in this context. As Walter Kendall 
has argued, if the socialist influence had existed more widely in the armed forces, and that there had 
been the ability to launch a coordinated movement, or they had established closer links with trade 
unions, the whole future of the state might well have been called into balance.115 SﾗﾉSｷWヴゲげ ┘ｷﾉﾉｷﾐｪﾐWゲゲ 
to join with trade unions is doubtful, but was a real threat in the minds of the authorities. Furthermore, 
the brutalising effect of the war itself must not be discounted. As George Mosse has argued, the post-
war world contained a certain brutalisation in politics, a heightened indifference to human life, and 
though the victorious nations of Britain and France were able to keep this largely under control, it too 
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was a significant threat.116 Jﾗﾐ L;┘ヴWﾐIW ｴ;ゲ ;ヴｪ┌WS デｴ;デ Bヴｷデ;ｷﾐ ;aデWヴ デｴW Fｷヴゲデ WﾗヴﾉS W;ヴ ┘;ゲ け; ﾐ;デｷﾗﾐ 
haunted by the fear that violence had slipped its chains.117 Cｴ;ヴﾉWゲ C;ヴヴｷﾐｪデﾗﾐ ヴWI;ﾉﾉWS デｴ;デ けデhe schism 
in the nation was between the fighting soldiers and the civilians, a psychological cleavage far too wide 
to be bridged by any political agitation in the back areas, and the question still to be answered was, 
ｴﾗ┘ ┘ﾗ┌ﾉS デｴW aｷｪｴデｷﾐｪ デヴﾗﾗヮゲ HWｴ;┗W ;aデWヴ デｴW┞ ┘WヴW SWﾏﾗHｷﾉｷゲWSいげ118 With these things considered, 
it is unsurprising that such paranoia existed about indiscipline. 
 
CONCLUSION 
In August Lloyd George complained to Churchill that demobilisation had slowed down. In reply, 
Cｴ┌ヴIｴｷﾉﾉ ;ｪヴWWS ;ﾐS SWデ;ｷﾉWS デｴｷヴデWWﾐ ヴW;ゲﾗﾐゲ ┘ｴ┞ デｴｷゲ ┘;ゲ デｴW I;ゲWが H┌デ デｴ;デ ｷデ ┘;ゲ けﾐWIWゲゲ;ヴ┞ デﾗ 
ﾗHゲWヴ┗W デｴ;デ デｴW ;ヴﾏ┞ ┘;ゲ ｷﾐ ; ゲデ;デW ﾗa ｪWﾐWヴ;ﾉ ｷﾐIｷヮｷWﾐデ ﾏ┌デｷﾐ┞ ｷﾐ J;ﾐ┌;ヴ┞ ;ﾐS FWHヴ┌;ヴ┞げ ;ﾐS ｴ;S 
けHWWﾐ ヴWゲデﾗヴWS デﾗ ; IﾗﾐSｷデｷﾗﾐ ﾗa ｪﾗﾗS SｷゲIipline and contentment by following the main principle of 
ヴWﾉW;ゲｷﾐｪ デｴW ﾏWﾐ ┘ｷデｴ デｴW ﾉﾗﾐｪWゲデ ゲWヴ┗ｷIW HWaﾗヴW デｴW ﾐW┘IﾗﾏWヴゲげく HW IﾗﾐIﾉ┌SWSが けｴﾗ┘ aﾗﾗﾉｷゲｴ デﾗ 
suppose that the armies which took more than four years to spread about all over the world could be 
brﾗ┌ｪｴデ ｴﾗﾏW ;ｪ;ｷﾐ H┞ ; ┘;┗W ﾗa デｴW ┘;ﾐSげく119 By this time, it was becoming clear that Bolshevism 
was no threat in the armed forces. Though discipline broke down, it had more to do with the perceived 
unjust nature of the demobilisation scheme, and the fact that for some the notions of self-sacrifice 
and patriotism no longer held relevance as a means to maintain order. Swift, quoting Peter Reese, has 
made the point that the strikes were not a representation of military radicalism, although the 
experience of war had served to anger and alienate many hundreds of thousands of men, they were 
けﾐﾗデ ;ﾐｪヴ┞ Wﾐﾗ┌ｪｴ ;デ デｴWｷヴ aWﾉﾉﾗ┘ Iｷデｷ┣Wﾐゲ デﾗ Iﾗ┌ヴデ デｴW ┌ﾐヴWゲデ デｴ;デ H;┞ﾗﾐWデゲ Hヴﾗ┌ｪｴデげが デｴW┞ SｷS ﾐﾗデ ┘ｷゲｴ 
to bring down the state.120 On 17th October 1919, Churchill finally declared that demobilisation was 
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complete. He reported that in the eleven months since the Armistice, an average of 10,000 men had 
HWWﾐ SｷゲIｴ;ヴｪWS W┗Wヴ┞ S;┞く Iデ ┘;ゲ デヴ┌W デﾗ ゲ;┞が ｴW ゲ;ｷSが けデｴ;デ デｴW ;ヴﾏ┞ ｴ;S ﾏWﾉデWS ;┘;┞げく121 
As 1919 progressed, a perceived threat from the extreme left, and fears over Bolshevism also 
melted away. Though soldiers were unhappy, their discontent was only rarely political in nature. This 
was despite concerted attempts by the Herald League, Daily Herald, and the SSAU to foment 
dissatisfaction. Their actions after the unrest at Folkestone and beyond in January meant that this 
threat had to be taken seriously, and great efforts were made to stifle their activities, including the 
reining in of the established press, an action which had also been so important during wartime. The 
perceptions of individuals in government, and the unrest across Europe certainly did much to heighten 
concerns, while this was coupled with an anxiety that the war had brutalised soldiers. Ultimately 
though, many soldiers had reached the end of their resilience and respect for military discipline. They 
had based much of their obedience on notions of patriotism and self-sacrifice, but this had terminated 
with the signing of the Armistice. The majority of men simply wanted to go home. 
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